how much of the other? Off the top of my head, I frankly am not smart enough to know that you can just throw that open to the market and that somehow the market would say you know, 50 percent needs to be licensed and 50 percent needs to be unlicensed or commons or what have you, which is why I actually do think that the government has a role to play there in helping to make that decision.

So going forward, is it both? Yeah, I mean we're not in -- as I've said I tend to be too practical sometimes, but I think the answer is certainly both and the government has a role to figure you know how much is right.

MR. FURTH: I'd like to ask if Martin has any perspective to lend on this from his experience in the U.K. and then I'd like to throw it open for a few minutes to the audience if they have questions on this topic as well.

DR. CAVE: Well, essentially we've had to address this question with even fewer facts than you have since it's only the past three weeks that the U.K. government has changed the rule in relation to unlicensed spectrum to permit the provision of services to the public rather than just

self-provision. As a consequence of that, the demand on unlicensed spectrum has been curtailed.

We have, however, been very worried about the prospect of congestion in the light particularly of possibly misleading horror stories that we've heard from this side of the Atlantic.

And that has predisposed me personally to favor the hybrid solution in many cases which you've identified, which is the use of managers, will be able to bid on a competitive basis for spectrum and then try and pile in as many possibly low value users as can actually be accommodated within the band. This is just simply driven largely by the difficulty of doing the risk analysis. Clearly, it would be a disaster if whole swathes of spectrum became effectively sterilized as a result of congestion and their availability disappeared.

However, there may be certain areas in which unlicensed spectrum can survive and for that Ι'd be reluctant to see it abandoned reason But my own preference would be to sort completely. stick roughly to the line that Tom has identified acknowledged that and unlicensed spectrum has а zero price but a competitive

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spectrum market can actually produce prices which are probably pretty close to zero in certain contexts.

MR. FURTH: Questions from the audience? We've got mikes in the back. Stand up and identify yourself and direct your question to us, thank you.

MR. REED: Yes. David Reed. Well, actually more of a comment than a question on the particular question you raised earlier about how we might practically decide how to balance between "unlicensed" or commons, both of which are bad terms or the inclusive license market approach. And what I think probably best thought about in this space is two things, one responding to Martin Cave's point which is that in fact we have no We are so far from congestion in the spectrum other than by regulatory limits that the likelihood that we'd have congestion in the next 5 to 10 years, if we freed it all up, is very low even if they allowed people to use it for terrible reasons.

The practical fact of the matter is that the old regime, which is neither of these two, has been the most inefficient of all. As far as

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1	the new types of ideas, these spectrum auctions,
2	secondary markets, versus the other, I think we
3	should have a horse race. And I put all my money,
4	and I think I would recommend to all my investor
5	friends, to put all my money on the unlicensed
6	side. But it's fine, a perfectly reasonable
7	strategy would be to basically have either a
8	regulatory proceeding or a congressional. I'm not
9	sure who gets to do it.
10	But it basically says for every new allocation of
11	spectrum to a new use, half of it goes to auction
12	and half of it goes to unlicensed, both primary
13	users. If all the economic value migrates into one
14	thing or the other, we'll know our answer.
15	If we hobble one of those approaches by
16	unreasonable rules that basically then we won't
17	find our answer and I think now is the time to get
18	the answer.
19	MR. FURTH: Do you want to comment,
20	David?
21	MR. WYE: Yes. Throughout all these
22	workshops, one thing that I've noticed is there
23	seems to be a tendency to kind of if you will tar
24	one model or the other with kind of the sins of the

past if you will. I am the first to admit that

some of the, we won't say broadcasting -- some of broadcasting spectrum probably isn't efficiently used as it could be. That doesn't mean that all licensed spectrum is being used inefficiently. I actually happen to think that T&TA Wireless its uses spectrum pretty darn efficiently.

On the other hand, we all recognize that there are, at least I thought, one of the things I thought I knew as a truth, and anybody can correct me if I'm wrong, is that the reason we keep going kind of from 900 to 2.4 to 5 is because at least the reports that I've heard or seen in the press is that it's because the bands keep getting congested. Now, that's not to say that that can't be solved through better use of technology. I think that's maybe what David Reed was just saying.

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But I just would perhaps offer a cautionary note that just because we did it wrong in the past doesn't mean we're going to continue to do it wrong in the future. And I think that's the whole point of what this task force is all about is not to throw the baby out with the bathwater, but how do we make things better? How do we make the

licensed regime better? How do we make the unlicensed regime better? How do we make them better together, and so maybe we could carry that forward.

MR. STEVENSON: Carl Stevenson. Jennifer asked what I thought was actually a very good question and that was what happens to the customer of the unlicensed device where the current rules say you must accept any interference you receive from anything else. Period. End of story. And then Mr. Wye's comment also about the apparent congestion and things that started out in 900 and went to 2.4 and now are going to 5. I'd like to make a couple observations on that.

First of all, when Part 15 Spread Spectrum Use first started and IEEE 802 started developing standards for computer networking, the environment was very different. The use of these things has grown to such an extent that we do find ourselves needing more spectrum. Part of it is a problem that Mr. Wye seemed to at least allude to or point to a little bit is that there are no standards. It's basically a free for all. You have a mixture of things like cordless phones and baby monitors and so on and so forth that don't

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look out for each other, don't use the spectrum cooperatively. And this causes a lot of the interference that does exist in the Part 15 bands.

And I would submit that, as I mentioned the other day, that if the Commission were to take a look at the National Technology Transfer Act, at least a very strong encouragement that federal regulatory agencies take open industry consensus standards into account. I think we're at the stage where the 802 standards have become so ubiquitous and have become so important to society that they actually have enough public interest value that they really should have their status in some sense upgraded so that the users do have a little more of an expectation of better performance.

In terms of technology transfer, all the way along the line we've retained backward compatibility. We haven't stranded users. I think the standards organizations have done a pretty good job. Some of the problems that we face in the Part 15 bands are due to other systems that aren't cooperative, that don't work together well. So some way of dealing with that issue is something the task force should consider.

MR. FURTH: Comments.

MS. WARREN: Yes. I just wanted to respond to something Carl said which was about unlicensed perhaps having the need to be able to afford greater protection to the consumer. be paraphrasing what he said. But I think that then argues for unlicensed uses to perhaps have their own unencumbered spectrum rather than sharing it's very difficult because while manufacturer understands that it is under Part 15, the consumer doesn't read the last line of the instruction manual too closely as the gentleman on session one panel a week or so ago acknowledged.

So unless there is some way to fully notify so that the consumer can't miss it like on the device that you have no expectations or your expectations have to be limited with the way this device operates, it's very difficult for shared use and there's obviously a proceeding in play right now that raises that issue directly.

MR. FURTH: Ed?

MR. EDGAR: I just want to ask the same question I asked at the unlicensed workshop we had almost two weeks ago. I'm hearing two conflicting views here. Cut it open, let it be Darwinian. And the other one is we need some rules. And I'm

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talking about the unlicensed spectrum. 1 My question is, is it broke and we have 2 3 to fix it today or are we anticipating problems in 4 the future? I'd appreciate anybody who 5 wants comment on that. 6 And I also have a second question. 7 Most of the day today has been on unlicensed, which 8 I've found interesting. And that's fine because if 9 that's what you want to talk about, by all means 10 But I do have a question about 11 talk about it. shared use of spectrum in terms of rights and 12 13 responsibilities. What about things that those of you are 14 familiar with -- the north points of the future. 15 Or what the responsibilities of incumbents to keep 16 their technology? Let me put it this way. What 17 are the obligations, or what should the obligations 18 of incumbents be to keep their technology current, 19 the unlicensed spectrum or in either in 20 licensed spectrum? 21 Comments on that because I MR. FURTH: 22 think that's a good segue on where we want to go on 23 24 the next sort of section of our discussion.

defining the rights better as David talked about

and under both models.

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Does anybody want to comment on Ed's questions?

Т think MR. HAZLETT: Yes. the assumption is there is an unlicensed model and we should get the rules right and make sure that people cooperate. The assumption implicit is there is a need for coordination. There is a scarcity It's costly not to problem. You can't interfere. There's a need for some coordination, interfere. some protocols and some etiquette and that needs to That's right, but again be coordinated. regulatory model is wrong.

That is to say this is a competitive market function and just suppose, just get crazy and suppose that the 1996 proposal by Senator Pressler to issue overlay rights covering the entire broadcast TV spectrum, 402 megahertz, and that that proposal had gone through and we had given out several licenses, 580 megahertz licenses or some larger number of smaller allocation or whatever. But you had gotten those licenses with complete flexibility into the market place, and they had to respect the incumbent broadcaster rights, you know, to protect the three or four

American households that don't subscribe to cable or satellite.

The use of all unused, somebody said in rural areas TV spectrum is slightly underutilized. That's going down as the understatement of the new these flexible rights against one band manager competing against another, you could have all kinds of economic activity. could see mobile services, very close to what we could see fixed wireless today. You have broadband, close to what we see today. You could see all sorts of stuff is cutting edge. You could see all sorts of stuff we haven't seen yet.

Different rules, different coordination mechanisms, different architectures certainly could be proposed. And that's the trial and error you want. You want these competitors in the market place to be able to offer their various solutions. In general, those will be shared solutions if you want to speak in those terms, but just as cellular and PCS systems are shared systems. But you will have an opportunity to actually have competitive rivalry between these solutions and the consumer interests are clearly on the side of that rivalry.

If you're at the target and you're

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walking down the aisle with a telephone and you think that the FCC is giving you this compatibility of everything at 900 megahertz, you're in the wrong Go over to the software aisle. There's no FCC to protect you on software and there's lots of compatibilities and by the way there's lots of But that's a better market. incompatibilities. It's much more progressive, lots more innovation, lots more great, new stuff and lots welfare created for society because of the dynamics of that process, despite the fact there is a cost associated with being stranded on an eight-track stereo tape or a Commodore computer.

MR. CALABRESE: I think to some degree questions answer to both of Ed's be the informed by remembering, and I just to reiterate what I said earlier the distinction between the two types of unlicensed technology that we're talking about. You know, today's 802.11 type technology which is channelized and the future of going to stretch out all unlicensed, which is both licensed and spectrum across across the unlicensed bands on an underlay basis.

And so the Commission's unlicensed policy making needs to proceed on two very

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different, but parallel tracks, with respect to And I think that in both cases we will need rules. There is an ongoing role for the Commission, but the rules are of a very different type than the licensing. So for example, when Martin talks about licensing a band manager for unlicensed devices, that is probably Imagine if did that the unnecessary. we on internet, if we had a bandwidth manager for the I mean why not instead you know have you have open protocols and etiquettes and so compliance-like, compliance licensing for devices that can share that space.

you know, the same thing would probably be true with respect to the underlays. second question the concerning And then on interference standards, Dale Hatfield, I know, has been blue in the face talking about the need to regulate receiver standards because interference, if we allow these fragile old dumb devices to lock up the spectrum, it's really standing in the way of innovation and efficiency.

And so what we need to do, and that's one of the main reasons against any permanent, vested interest in frequencies because the

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Commission will need to continue a role in evolving the interference standard. And I think we're going to go to talk about that.

But it's very important, if we're going to redefine license rights, as a bundle that on one hand has complete service flexibility, but on the other hand limits interference both in terms of what you can impose and what you must receive, then that standard, that interference standard has to evolve with technology. You can't just say these are your fee simple property rights forever and leave it at that.

MS. FARQUHAR: I think we've already segued into the second part of our panel and so let me pick up there with respect to defining basic spectrum usage rights and where Ed started and where Michael just picked up in particular.

Our frequent criticism is that noted of spectrum usage rights is that they're not clearly defined by the FCC's rules right now. So one part of the question is in what sense are they imprecise or not clear at how or why does that need to be And also, should there be time limits or fixed? term limits if government, for instance, address these issues and set some limitations?

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Should we recognize that technology evolves? Should there be an indefinite period of time for which say 5 or 10 years for which these rules are effective and then you automatically revisit it? Do term limitations or something else? Or should there be some other mechanism to revisit this over time?

Let me start with Martin to give him a chance to think about this and then we'll take comments from others at the table.

DR. CAVE: Naturally, these are questions we had to address as well in writing the particularly on report and let me focus duration question because I think that's really In essence, the conclusion we guite difficult. came to was that you could either adopt a band specific policy which would, in essence, mean that you would have to look at each band and decide how the technology was going to change and adjust the duration on the basis of that.

But as we know, that's a pretty fragile basis upon which to base decision making because we don't know how the technologies are actually going to develop. So in conclusion I think we came to the view that it was probably best to have infinite

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duration and licenses but with some kind of reserve power for the government's compulsorily to purchase the licenses at some kind of market evaluation where that was necessary, if the system which I've described appeared to generate particularly severe market failures and strategic behavior. But we were still a bit unhappy with that because nobody wants to give governments or regulators the powers to remove other people's property compulsorily.

So I think this is a very open question and really is one for the purposes of my report we sort of handed on to the next line of people who are going to have to frame the legislation.

MS. FAROUHAR: Joe?

I'd like to comment on MR. GATTUSO: It seems to me in listening to the other this. workshop sessions and also in knowing about spectrum management generally, sometimes I wonder if we have advanced to a point over the last 70 or 80 years of having radio where we think we know the rights to a certain point and we make decisions in spectrum management thinking we know a certain amount about rights and responsibilities, but we have a lot of uncertainty back a step that we would not tolerate in other areas.

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furious. fast and You've always come qot property rights analogy, the real property. But you can have intangible rights analogies. You have the highway analogies. In every one of those cases, I think of okay, I believe in analogies so I'll throw out some. You think about are there certain principles that have developed in terms of real property you've had six, seven hundred years of development where it's already established in

are established.

The

certain things

property you've got title.

analogies

You've got a certain sense that as a general principle a purchaser of a right would have a certain rights for -- they fall into certain classifications and there are certain things under those classifications you can do. There's a developed body of law with respect to newcomers versus existing users of the rights and you have both time and you have nuisance law. And I think of the equivalent in spectrum and it's like not knowing if you're getting an oil and gas lease how long it's going to last or what does it mean when

you have an oil and gas right. Well, we know that

in oil and gas. And it means like if you want to use the highway example, we know that as a general principle everywhere in the United States that a car entering in the highway, its wheels are already on the highway. We know that.

But it seems that we are constantly debating and through the analogies very simple things like who owns the spectrum? One person says there's no ownership. True. The other person says well the analogy goes a certain way. We haven't established that. We're asking a basic question -- how long does the right last? Well, you can argue that some ways given practice since the Federal Radio Commission and given court decisions and broadcasting elsewhere, the right does continue indefinitely in certain areas.

Real question is should it or mot and that's why I think Martin Cave had the difficult analysis of saying well, which is better? Do you want something -- do you want the ability to go back and revisit that and do you institutionalize that or do you have a system where that's there? So I think that these fundamental questions should be addressed and there are especially with usage certain things with respect to what the party

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holds, what incumbents hold, and what they're allowed to do with those secondarily.

MS. FARQUHAR: Comments from the people in the panel?

Mike?

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MR. KURTIS: I think the current model that you have in CMRS is an indication of how this There is an expectation of a can work properly. license renewal that is subject to being taken away if you haven't met certain standards. you don't want to be in a situation where the the license in a particular person who holds technology especially like CMRS that requires a lot of time and a lot of money to deploy, that that license does not have an ongoing expectation of being able to renew. That's an absolute way to cut off all capital available for building a costly, complicated expensive network.

But you do maintain at the Commission a safeguard from that spectrum lying fallow or not used in methods that have properly being that construction requirements at the end οf period. Other people can come in and take over and apply for licenses that have not been properly used if the carrier is not acting appropriately,

although there was an expectation of renewal, it's not an absolute right. But to the extent that the carriers are doing the right thing, there has to be the expectation that their license is going to be continued, if you want to be able to get full use of that spectrum.

MS. FARQUHAR: That's a good point with respect to -- and please, chime in and raise this issue too. Jennifer mentioned earlier consumers expectations with respect to devices, products. Michael just noted that expectations of the capital market and investors. Are there other expectations out there that fall into this realm when you think about it as well?

David?

MR. WYE: Yes. Obviously, I would tend to agree with Michael on that. My company spends billions of dollars building out its licenses. This year alone we'll spend over five billion dollars trying to improve our coverage and our capacity and everything else. If I think that in three years that's going to go away, why would I ever spend that money? And although I agree theoretically that you know the licenses have a renewal expectancy, I certainly believe that they

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should. I think one thing that has not perhaps been one of the Commission's shining moments in the past is that when licensees have not lived up to their obligations, they have not taken the licenses back.

And I think if we're going to make this system work, and I think it works well now, the Commission has got to stand up and say you're not using it, I'm taking it back. I know that AT&T Wireless has turned licenses back in because we're not able to meet the requirements of the terms of the license. And that should be an absolute mantra at the Commission is enforcement. We're back to enforcement again. It's not that the system is necessarily broken and we have to change the terms of the licenses, we simply need to enforce the system that we have in place now.

MS. FARQUHAR: Jennifer?

MS. WARREN: I just want to add one even though I said I wouldn't come at this from a satellite perspective. You have to apply again the principle of practicality to go back to what Peter Pitsch said earlier. Even if you were looking at limiting time frames for licenses, if throwing out a five year time period, you don't even have the

satellite launched then. So I mean there are very different expectations by industry as well as to the terms and the means to satisfy the terms of the licenses and I think that has to be taken into account.

And I would also say the enforcement issue is an important one from the satellite perspective and we started to see that from our arena and it's healthy, painful but healthy, and we would encourage the Commission to keep doing that.

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MS. FARQUHAR: To what extent -- I'm sorry.

MR. CALABRESE: Ι just want to make point in this discussion is I hope we're not leaving the impression though that there's a kind of, I quess, I would call a false dichotomy between some of these. Because, for example, renewal expectancy is not, I don't believe is contradictory to limited term licensing because you can have what we do today, right? You're saying in PCS a limited term license with renewal expectancy, the question that. kind of on what terms, how we do Similarly, with interference you renewal can expectancy, limited term licenses and still have

the Commission migrate the interference standard along with technology over decades. So none of those things are in terms of assembling a bundle of rights, I don't think any of those three things are in contradiction, although they may be in some tension. And that's one reason too in response to David's point about internalizing the opportunity cost of spectrum.

relying Again, rather than the Commission to have to yank spectrum back, if we move to a more flexible market oriented allocation policy using a price mechanism, then those sort of market base incentives for efficiency should be built right in. The problem is though we have commercial users who are not on a level playing Many like AT&T Wireless and so on who pay field. for their spectrum and others who haven't. why earlier at the very outset I was mentioning that if we are going to create this new type of license with this valuable service and flexibility, when we assign these new licenses that we ought to perhaps take advantage of moving to a kind of annual user fee for spectrum use because that can serve several important objectives that are in the statute. It can recover to the public

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an ongoing and market based return on the public resource, internalize these opportunity costs for efficiency. It can reduce, and I think it's an important flaw with the current auction system is these are sort of viewed, the companies are forced to view these and it's even worse in Europe. they're forced to view these as one off auctions, where you're sort of bidding to have control of this resource for all time. I say worse in Europe because they were actually licensing, it's like a business license. Even if you owned first or second generation license you couldn't do 3G unless you went into this auction and paid more money.

whether we use competitive assignment in entry or not, do it just for the first term. And then after upon renewal give the incumbent either now or these incumbents who get the spectrum through auction, give them the option if they want these valuable flexibility rights, then they can just convert to an annual rental fee system. And that can be based, imputed, based on a modest percentage of the value that's evidenced by the secondary market transactions.

MR. MILLER: I'd like to quickly

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I like hearing your user fee proposal because the LMCC discussed this and even I think proposed it many years ago. And the reason is with auctions one thing I think a lot of people don't look at is even economically they're not really that good because the government gets the money today and then as the winner builds out his system, he deducts the auction price and his operating cost years down the road when government five much higher, government revenues expenses are suffer because they got all the money today instead of being spread over the years by your user fee. So I like that concept.

I'd like to address the question that didn't get answered about what incentive is there spectral efficient incumbents to use more users, equipment. For commercial this whole conversation seems to be dominated by commercial and what we call private radio users and there is an economic incentive for governmental users, there an economic incent. There's really isn't economic disincentive since they have existing infrastructure they pay millions of dollars for tax revenues that are down.

The FCC tried to address the congestion

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